

AU/AF FELLOWS/NNN/2004-00

AIR FORCE FELLOWS (SDE)

AIR UNIVERSITY

**MILITARY CHAPLAINS AS PEACE BUILDERS:
EMBRACING INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS
IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

by

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A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2004

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE APR 2004		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Chaplains as Peace Builders: Embracing Indigenous Religions in Stability Operations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Maxwell AFB, AL 36112				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 50	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Executive Summary

The doctrinal role of United States military chaplains must be expanded to allow for formal inclusion of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders into stability operations. This additional role for chaplains beyond the traditional function of providing for religious and spiritual support of military personnel and their families might best be described as the role of religious liaison. In one sense, this additional role of religious liaison could be viewed as an expansion of the traditional chaplain role of advisor to the commander.

Religion is often ignored by United States diplomats and policymakers in developing and implementing foreign policy. The United States attempts to avoid religion in an effort to respect the personal dimension of faith. However, religion must be viewed as a force useful in stability operations rather than an issue to disregard or overcome. Politicians and diplomats need to understand and embrace indigenous religious leaders. As the stabilization process is developed, indigenous religious leaders must be included in order to realize long-term stability.

Currently, United States military chaplains are trained to conduct religious area analyses and assessments, but primarily for the purpose of advising the commander. The expanded role as religious liaison would allow for chaplains to directly interface with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders with the goal of developing dialogue, building relationships, promoting goodwill and creating formal inter-religious councils.

Recommended changes effecting doctrine, training and assignments are necessary to facilitate this expanded role of chaplains as religious liaisons. Although the following recommendations are primarily directed to the United States Army, they are applicable to other military services.

- Expand doctrine to establish military chaplains as religious liaisons.
- Train military chaplains to standard in core competencies as religious liaisons.
- Modify training through the military chaplain schools to include curriculum that will incorporate the required core competencies.
- Assign at least one chaplain per Civil Affairs unit with the primary mission of coordinating with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders.
- Assign an additional chaplain to the headquarters of division size units to support battalion chaplains.
- Integrate curriculum at all levels of officer training to address the expanded chaplain's role as religious liaison.

A commander often has a military lawyer and intelligence officer by their side when substantial decisions are being addressed. Chaplains in the future will be just as important to a commander conducting stability operations, as currently are intelligence and legal personnel. Military leadership must be comfortable with embracing this added value by understanding that an individual does not have to become religious in order to understand religion and appreciate its importance in stability operations.

These policy recommendations would establish doctrine, training and assignments necessary for military chaplains to serve as religious liaisons with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders in stability operations. This policy implementation would

assist the United States military in transforming the asymmetric, soft power of indigenous religious influence into a significant source of power for mission accomplishment.

As the United States conducts foreign policy and military operations it must assess and consider the impact of religion in societies to achieve long-term stability in a region. Successful incorporation of religious groups and religious leaders for stability operations will enable a greater chance for achieving United States foreign policy goals.

1

Introduction

Plausible Scenario

The United States intelligence community is surprised to learn that a fundamentalist religious group calling itself the “Sword of Allah” has seized control of both weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the moderate Islamic Republic of Korastan. Korastani military is a probable source of aid from sympathizers within its ranks. The long suspected nuclear materials and delivery capability of Korastan have been confirmed independently through both Department of State and Department of Defense contacts with Korastani government officials.

Of greater immediate concern to the United States is confirmation of chemical and biological weapons and portable delivery systems also seized by Sword of Allah operatives. These weapons could be used against United States and coalition military members in neighboring countries. These portable weapons systems have been relocated to undetermined sites. Though United States and coalition military forces could survive

an attack with minimal casualties, the civilian population is not nearly as prepared or trained for such an attack.

Two audio-taped communications have been received from the Sword of Allah indicating their intent and demands. The first communication stated their plan to immediately launch the full arsenal of weapons of mass destruction against both United States and coalition military forces in neighboring countries if their demands are not met. A similar threat was made against the “Jewish puppet of the Great Satan” the nation of Israel, if any military action was taken against them. Their demands are for all Western powers to immediately withdraw from Muslim lands, United States pay war reparations to injured Muslims of \$500 billion through the Muslim World Congress and United States immediately discontinue any military aid to Israel.

Three hours later, a second communication arrived at Al-Jazeera broadcasting network stating a strike would be launched within eight hours unless the United States demonstrated a sincere respect for the Sword of Allah and its demands. This respect must be indicated by a response delivered through those who “understand the peaceful religion of Islam.” The Sword of Allah would welcome martyrdom for their righteous cause.

Department of Defense and Department of State are working together in consult with the United States Institute of Peace to craft a response. Additionally, consideration is given to the issue of geography in formulating a negotiating team. Israel and its Arab neighbors are in a high state of military readiness. United States and coalition military forces in countries bordering Korastan are experiencing increased attacks and unrest.

These attacks are by civilians incited to action by local clerics who view this situation as possible divine judgment on the “god-less West.”

This scenario is all too realistic. It is not meant to focus on any specific religion, but to simply draw an illustration. Islam and the current situation the United States is encountering in Iraq are used as examples throughout this research paper. However, other religions and geographical areas of conflict are equally applicable. To avoid this scenario from becoming an actual event, the United States must embrace religion as a diplomatic partner. To ignore this fact, is to ignore reality. This paper is a step towards ensuring this plausible scenario never occurs.

Chaplains as Religious Liaisons

The doctrinal role of United States military chaplains must be expanded to allow for formal inclusion of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders into stability operations. This additional role for chaplains beyond the traditional function of providing for religious and spiritual support of military personnel and their families might best be described as the role of religious liaison. In one sense, this additional role of religious liaison could be viewed as an expansion of the traditional chaplain role of advisor to the commander. There are current examples of United States military chaplains functioning in this expanded role.

Chaplains of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) regularly meet in Iraq with religious leaders. Chaplain (Captain) John Stutz states that one of the biggest issues is the constant bombardment of misinformation about coalition forces and what they are doing for the local populace. According to Stutz, “The problem is they are usually getting the wrong information about something or they’re getting no information.” Stutz

further states that “Our job is to make sure the facts are given to these leaders so they can disseminate it to their communities.”¹ Chaplains can provide facts about United States forces intent, their current efforts and clarify misinformation. Accurate information will provide for increased understanding and build trust between local populace and military forces.

Chaplain (Colonel) Frank E. Wismer, II states that in areas of Iraq where chaplains and commanders engage indigenous religious leaders, coalition forces have had some success in decreasing anti-coalition actions.² Commander Emilio Marrero sought to create bridges between his role as a Christian chaplain and various respected holy men in Iraq. He plainly wore the cross on his uniform against advice of others who suggested that he keep a low profile as a Christian chaplain. His actions have helped mitigate one of the greatest myths among Iraqis that Americans are secular and therefore devils, infidels or non-believers. This openness in faith proved to be a valuable asset and offered many opportunities for positive exchanges between United States military forces and indigenous religious leaders.³

Chaplains have expressed the importance that all religious groups be represented in efforts to engage religious leaders. Chaplain (Major) Dean Bonura, of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division states that his Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) held numerous meetings with various religious leaders across multiple faiths, from Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims to Armenian and Roman Catholic bishops and priests. These meetings with religious leaders have proven essential in assisting the coalition mission.⁴ United States Air Force Chaplains and Assistants deployed in theatre with Air Expeditionary Groups also recognize the importance of “doing their part to win the hearts and minds of

the Iraqis”. For example, while accompanying Office of Special Investigations agents on humanitarian missions, chaplains were able to work among local populations.⁵

Dr. Elliot Cohen states that the preeminent and most crucial issue of our time is inclusion of religion in the development of United States foreign policy as an element of national power and the incorporation of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders for stability operations.⁶ Notably, United States policy and practice goes to great lengths to respect the value of religion for United States citizens. However, United States policy and intentional practice often fails to recognize the importance of indigenous religions when conducting military operations. The intention to consider and embrace religion in planning for stability operations could be the determining factor between a rapid, constructive result and a destructive, long and costly process.

Overview

To address the policy issue just discussed, this paper will be organized in the following manner. Chapter Two highlights indigenous religious groups and religious leaders as an element of national power and how that translates to the importance of religion in stability operations. Further, Department of Defense’s role during initial stability operations is illustrated, to include selection of local leadership.

Chapter Three discusses why chaplains are the best choice to serve as religious liaisons. An analysis is performed on a given group of candidates based on defined criteria validating the selection. To further emphasize that chaplains are the best choice, numerous historical references of chaplains as religious liaisons during stability operations are reviewed. Various past conflicts are examined to show the extensive range

of value added by chaplains. In addition, other countries that integrate their chaplains into the role of religious liaison are highlighted.

Chapter Four looks at the required modifications necessary for military chaplains to successfully serve as a religious liaison in concert with indigenous religious groups. Changes to authorization levels for chaplains, as well as necessary doctrinal enhancements and additional training requirements are highlighted. Also, actions required to transition responsibilities from the military chaplain to other organizations are described.

Chapter Five highlights recommendations of this research paper and identifies responsible agencies. Potential objections to the issues put forth in this paper are drawn out and responses to those objections are developed. Lastly, areas for future research are identified that would continue the steps taken with this paper.

2

Religion in Stability Operations

Importance of Indigenous Religions

Rabbi Marc Gopin, Director of the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University writes, “Whatever one discovers in the roots of war must become a principle part of recovery, growth, and the visioning of new civilization...if religion, culture, ethnicity are all implicated then they must be vindicated, and those that hold fast to them must find a sure and true way to engage the new civilization.”⁷ Gopin’s statement identifies religion as a necessary element in conflict resolution when it is part of the dynamic of conflict.

Religion is best viewed as a force useful in stability operations rather than an issue to disregard or overcome. Often the United States attempts to avoid religion in an effort to respect the personal dimension of faith. Other nations that do not separate church and state perceive this attempt at respect as dismissive, thereby furthering the perception of the “god-less West.” The United States adheres foundationally to separation of church and state, while Islam adheres to the integration of politics and religion. In the Muslim

world, religious leaders are often more powerful than political leaders. However, they are often not included in the “axes of power” considered for stabilization planning and implementation by the United States according to Colonel (retired) William Flavin of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.⁸

Support of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders can greatly impact success of United States foreign policy. As the stabilization process is developed, indigenous religious leaders must be included in order to realize long-term stability. Politicians and diplomats need to understand and embrace the importance of indigenous religious leaders. Current United States foreign policy does not always identify religion as a consideration in stabilization operations and planning.⁹

David Smock, Ph.D., Director of the Religion and Peacemaking Initiative at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. also advocates that religion defines the cultural identity in many societies. Furthermore, Smock states that religion is often ignored by United States diplomats and policymakers in developing and implementing foreign policy. However, the United States must embrace it as a means towards conflict resolution and as an enabler towards long-term stability.¹⁰

In the Western world, religious beliefs and the clergy who sustain them are still an influential force. However, this influence is not on par with the much higher degree of power normally afforded clergy in many countries. In those countries religious leaders and congregations form a wide association of influence that communicate and reach a large number of citizens. This impact is especially relevant where government is weak and lacking a central authority powerful enough to enforce the rule of law. In those

situations it is often clergy and networks of congregations that contribute significantly to local stability.¹¹

In relating foreign policy and conducting military operations in the Islamic world, the United States must recognize that maintaining stability and building peace requires accurately communicating our plans and intentions to all levels of Muslim society. It is through communication and understanding that we may win the hearts and cooperation of local populace. Victory for moderate Muslims over an extremist minority vying for control in many Muslim nations depends upon the United States effectively filling the “information gap.” Miscommunication can lead to misunderstandings and misperceptions of United States intent and plans. Stability operations require a parallel campaign resulting in national institutions committed to freedom, tolerance and basic human rights for all citizens.¹²

Opposition forces often employ asymmetric strategy of using religion, religious symbolism and religious misinformation as tools for recruitment and enlisting support. Recognition of this strategy by the United States affords an opportunity for developing a strategic and operational response.¹³ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in response to an inquiry about how well the Department of Defense intentionally brings indigenous religious leaders into the planning and implementation process for stability operations, stated that: “Overall we are not doing a good job...of trying to include religious leaders to show respect for their faith as part of stability operations.”¹⁴

Role of Military Leadership

Military operations are conducted in four phases with Phase IV being stability operations. Preferably this phase begins with official cessation of hostilities and

discontinues when the situation is stable and secure for transition to the Department of State. The situation in Iraq has posed unique challenges due to continued violent opposition to the presence of United States forces. Attacks on civilian population by groups vying for power have produced continuing instability and difficulty in completely transitioning control from Department of Defense to Department of State. L. Paul Bremer III, the former diplomat and counter terrorism official who has led the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) since May 2003 has expressed confidence that Iraqis can build a democracy that values religious and political freedom.¹⁵

United States military forces in areas where hostilities occur are in position as the primary resource in the vicinity to initiate actions for conducting stability operations. Although the State Department plays a major role in coordinating the development of freedom and democracy in a post-conflict nation, it can do so only within the context of security provided by United States Armed Forces. United States military commanders on the ground are responsible for securing the safety, welfare and livelihood of the local population. It is tactical combatant forces in theatre who conduct initial governance operations and remain on the ground in oversight until the political transition essential to stability or peace efforts are complete.¹⁶

The Department of Defense is effectively in charge not only of the military aspects of the counterinsurgency, but also of reconstruction work and of political development. In most provinces, United States military officers selected local government officials representative of their respective populations.¹⁷ United States military officers in Iraq spend much of their time meeting local sheiks and apportioning the thin funds at their disposal for rebuilding. In some situations it is not unusual for the United States Army to

go out in the morning on a patrol and return in the afternoon for an internal meeting about dispersing small grants to local health clinics. Clearly the burden of responsibility for stability operations remains with the military commanders on the ground in Iraq.¹⁸

Leadership of the 1st Armored Division, located in Eastern Baghdad, committed itself to building a partnership with religious leaders in Baghdad to enhance the CPA's mission to stabilize Baghdad. They recognized the significant role religious leaders would play in a mission committed to stabilization and peace for the region. The unit began forging alliances through the neighborhood advisory councils and via networking from existing contacts with indigenous religious leaders thereby establishing rapport for further dialogue.¹⁹

For Iraqis, religion has been tied to the political process and governing body. The CPA currently has no policy regarding interaction with religious groups and religious leaders and generally has a laissez-faire approach to building an inter-religious forum. Furthermore, there is no articulated or written policy that guides the CPA's relationship with indigenous religious leaders in the reconstruction of Iraq. Lack of these policies may be due to a Department of State misinterpretation of the United States principle of separation of church and state as applicable to United States foreign policy. Additionally it may relate to the practice of prohibiting the endorsement of a specific religion as a matter of United States policy or practice.²⁰

Indigenous religions and religious leaders are critical factors to be included in stability operations. Crane and Terrill of the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College state that any "culturally-based efforts by the United States to assume away differences between Americans and Iraqis can only doom the effort for

rebuilding.”²¹ It is important to note that even without a formal United States policy or strategy to assess religious issues for inclusion in stability operations, Crane and Terrill managed to cite 19 of 135 tasks, three “critical”, five “essential”, and 11 “important”, as necessary to the reconstruction of Iraq that are either religious in focus or are impacted by the religious culture. Having established that religion is a key defining element in culture that is essential for consideration in stability operations, the question of who will address the issue and how they will do so must be explored.

3

Chaplains in Stability Operations

Military Chaplains as the Best Choice

In his book *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*, Dr. Douglas Johnston advocates the use of military chaplains in stability operations. Dr. Johnston states that the multi-faith experience and extensive interpersonal skills that military chaplains possess are attributes perfectly suited for the inclusion of religion into stability operations.²² Dr. Johnston, President of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., in his article *We Neglect Religion at Our Peril*, further states that military chaplains can develop in-depth understanding of the religious and cultural distinctions in a given environment through their personal interactions with indigenous religious communities.²³

Military chaplains are uniquely suited and positioned within United States military structure to function as the initial component resource to provide for inclusion of indigenous religious groups into stability operations. For comparison purposes, Figure 1 contrasts the most likely candidates among United States military personnel for religious

liaison when evaluated against the criteria defined below. Although Figure 1 is specific to United States Army personnel, other military services have similar candidates which can be evaluated by the same criteria.

Criteria as it relates to the role and function of religious liaison were generalized into the basic core areas of training, skills, credentials and accessibility. Training criteria included general knowledge of major world religions, faiths, practices and beliefs. Also critical is the impact of religion on society and sensitivity to religious customs and nuances. Skills criteria were identified as negotiation, religious diplomacy and consensus building. While arguable, credentials criteria were defined as how the officer's title or functional description might be perceived by the local population. While not precise, this criterion can be assessed within acceptable limits of predictability through a perceptive study of indigenous religious history and culture. Accessibility criteria were defined as being quickly and consistently available to the battalion commander for religious liaison.

The battalion was used as the representative group for evaluation since it is the normal size military element conducting Phase IV operations. Personnel most likely to possess abilities related to liaison activity were identified from the battalion headquarters and the next highest headquarters at brigade level. Likelihood to possess liaison skills was determined based upon the traditional training and function of the officers selected. The best candidates were determined to be the Judge Advocate General, Personnel Officer (S-1), Intelligence Officer (S-2), Battalion Chaplain and the Civil Affairs Officer.

Y		X = Criteria Categories			
		Y = Personnel Evaluated			
Civil Affairs	Limited	Yes	Yes	No	4
Chaplain	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Intel (S-2)	Limited	No	No	Yes	5
Personnel (S-1)	Limited	Yes	Limited	Yes	2
Judge Advocate	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	3
	Training	Skills	Credentials	Accessibility	Final Ranking
					X

Figure 1: Religious Liaison Selection Based on Battalion Staffing

Using the criterion parameters stated earlier, a synopsis of each officer's evaluation follows. The Civil Affairs officer possesses skills and credentials, but has limited training and virtually no accessibility to the combatant commander. The Intelligence officer is readily accessible to the commander, but has limited training and no necessary skills or credentials in the area of religious liaison. The Personnel officer possesses both skills and is accessible, but has limited training and credentials. The Judge Advocate General possesses the necessary skills, credentials and accessibility to the commander, but has no training for religious liaison tasks. Military chaplains have the training, skills, credentials and accessibility.²⁴

Based upon the analysis of each candidate's military specialty doctrine and training compared against the established criteria, it is clearly apparent that the initial proponent group responsible for inclusion of indigenous religious groups in stability operations should be military chaplains assigned to combat elements.

Historical Precedents Involving Chaplains

During the Spanish-American War, General Pershing used his chaplain in the Philippines as a liaison to negotiate with Catholic clergy in the North and Muslim leaders in the South in an attempt to ease hostilities. During the post-WWII Nuremberg trials of former Nazi war criminals, a United States military chaplain was assigned to provide religious support for war criminals. A benefit of this support was increased cooperation of criminals with authorities due to the unique trust engendered through the military chaplain relationship. The symbolic and actual success of these trials was crucial to stability and reconstruction of post-war Europe.²⁵

During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf recognized the importance of appointing military chaplains as religious liaisons to work with indigenous religious leaders. General Schwarzkopf designated United States Central Command Chaplain (Colonel) David P. Peterson as his representative to communicate and coordinate with Saudi Arabia religious authorities. Chaplain Peterson became instrumental in fostering friendships among indigenous religious leaders facilitating successful execution of the war while allied with the Muslim nation of Saudi Arabia.²⁶

During his tenure in command of stability operations in the Balkans, United States Army General Wesley Clark used his senior command chaplain, Rabbi Arnie Resnicoff,

extensively to function in a liaison capacity. Chaplain Resnicoff was tasked to promote goodwill with and among religiously conflicted communities and representative clerics. According to Dr. John Brinsfield, PhD., U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Historian, employing the chaplain as a religious liaison was verification of General Clark's understanding and intent that coordinating with these groups and individuals were essential to long-term stability in the region.²⁷ The 2001 position description for the Stabilization Force Theatre Chaplain continues to specifically designate the chaplain for liaising between military and religious leaders "involved in peacemaking and reconciliation activities."²⁸

Finally in a recent context, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Brigadier General (promotable) Martin E. Dempsey, Commander, United States Army 1st Armored Division successfully improved the environment for increased safety of his forces. He directed his chaplain to form an Inter-Religious Council (IRC) of local clerics. This effort was an attempt to increase force protection by easing the perceived hostility of local clerics. The IRC was to begin dialogue aimed at increased understanding and decreased hostility toward United States military operations. Brigadier General Dempsey took this action based upon his assessment that roadside bombings of coalition troops were linked to opposition to coalition activities voiced by local Muslim clerics. A measurable decrease in the incidence of roadside bombings followed the first meeting with local clerics in October 2003.²⁹

In some theatres of operation, individual chaplains having the same faith as indigenous religious groups were solicited to build goodwill among the local populace through the ministry of presence. Ministry of presence is a traditional, defined function of the chaplain usually associated with ministry among United States military troops.

However, in these theatres of operations the traditional ministry of presence role was successfully expanded to interface with local populations on the subject of religion. In Kosovo an Orthodox United States Army chaplain interacted with local Orthodox clergy to promote understanding and confidence toward United States military operations.³⁰ In a more subtle attempt to promote a basis for trust and cooperation with United States Army operations in Afghanistan, a Muslim United States Army chaplain prayed with Muslims in the local Mosque at the appointed hours.³¹

Value Added by Chaplains

Other examples exist to further illustrate how chaplains have been draw on by visionary commanders to connect with indigenous religious leaders and communities to increase success and reduce risks in stability operations. However, employment of chaplains for facilitating inclusion of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders for successful stability operations is not a universal practice. The value added by chaplains' involvement is directly dependent upon the degree of secularization of a society and the number of religious groups in the society. The greater the secularization of society and the more monolithic the religious demographic, the less need to use chaplains for incorporation of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders to ensure successful stability operations. The reciprocal is also true. Figure 2 depicts this relationship between chaplain use as religious liaison and the variables of secularization in a society and the number of religious groups within that society. Post-conflict, or stability operations in five United States conflicts illustrate this principle: the Philippines (Spanish-American War), Japan (World War II), Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq.




Figure 2: Value Added of Chaplain as Religious Liaison

As an example, the Philippines during the Spanish-American War were a secular society with a Catholic majority and a Muslim minority. In this situation chaplains had an intentional, but limited role as negotiators between Catholics and Muslims to promote stability. In addition, General John J. Pershing made sure his troops were informed on local culture and customs and had a basic knowledge of the Qur'an. General Pershing could himself conduct lengthy conversations about religion with local imams.³²

Japan was a secular society at the end of World War II (the belief in the Emperor as divine notwithstanding) with a nearly all Buddhist, mono-cultural population. It was not necessary for chaplains to act as religious liaisons with local communities to promote stability. Religious belief that allowed for "divine wind" Kamikaze suicide attacks also allowed for a citizenry subservient to United States policy for reconstruction after the

war. The populace was conditioned to obey the Emperor's direction to accept defeat and submit to American military authority.³³

During Somalia operations it could be argued that the first United States administration had success in humanitarian operations by including tribal leaders, while disregard for tribal leaders during the second United States administration led to failure in Somalia.³⁴ Overall, Somalia operations could have benefited from chaplain intervention to liaison with tribal leaders due to the lack of secularization in the society.

Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be a secular society in practice, but dominated by ethnic politics defined by multiple religious identities. A history of atrocities in the name of religion and a lack of religious homogeneity in the culture continue to compound the cost and difficulties associated with stability operations and nation-building.³⁵ Chaplains are having an influential and effective role in acting as liaisons to indigenous religious groups to promote peace and long-term stability.

When current hostilities started Iraq was initially a nominal Islamic, but practically secular state. Now Iraq seems to be quickly transforming into an Islamic religious state contested by the various Shi'ite and Sunni sects. Although a sense of Iraqi national identity does exist, it does not override these religious, tribal and ethnic identities. Currently in Iraq the role of chaplains is still emerging as religious liaisons for stability operations. The employment of methods used and practices observed of chaplains as religious liaisons is occurring by chance. The role of religious liaison needs to be planned and implemented through a deliberate design of foreign policy and subsequent military doctrine of the United States.³⁶

Foreign Military use of Chaplains

Examples of the use of chaplains for interaction with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders by foreign militaries further demonstrates the value of doctrinally establishing this role for United States military chaplains in stability operations. The most relevant foreign militaries examples are from Canada and South Africa, along with recent developments in Norway. These nations have recognized the value of using unit chaplains in a religious liaison capacity. To formalize the process in an effort to produce consistent success they are developing doctrine and policy to support and direct this chaplain function.

Padre (Major) S.K. Moore, CD of the Canadian Forces Chaplain Branch in his paper, *“The Ministry and Theology of Reconciliation in Operations”* describes the integrated position and function of Canadian Forces chaplains in stability operations. Padre Moore states that “as clergy in a theatre of operations, Canadian Forces chaplains have a distinctive role to play in interfacing with their civilian counterparts.”³⁷ In describing the chaplain role in relating to indigenous religious groups and populace he explains that their operations are permeated with the philosophy of reconciliation. This philosophy is the understanding that long-term stability can only happen in societies when true reconciliation occurs between conflicted groups. To attain reconciliation the conflicted groups must enter into dialogue that acknowledges wrongs, offers and receives forgiveness and mutually agrees upon a shared future as a society.

Canadian forces are primarily deployed in support of stability operations. This practice has allowed their chaplains extensive opportunity to understand the link between dialogues with indigenous religious leaders and identifying crucial humanitarian support

needs. Together they form a foundation for communicating the mission of stabilization forces in the reconciliation process leading to long-term stability. Further, this dialogue with and between indigenous leaders allows for “opportunity to share their story...acknowledging their pain and suffering, and...assist these religious and community leaders to...start the journey of reconciliation.”³⁸

Canadian chaplains find ease of movement among the population essential to advising the commander of probable humanitarian assistance projects that would strengthen reconciliation and stability operations. Access and freedom of movement are believed to be possible due to the high degree of influence and respect given to indigenous religious leaders and transferred to military chaplains serving in populations where many stability operations occur. Recognizing the importance of gaining and integrating support of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders for stability operations, Canadian Forces chaplains are used and militarily trained as the key resource tasked with this mission.³⁹

A paper by South African Defence Force Chaplains, Ignatious Fumaneklie Gqiba and Sybrand van Niekerk entitled “*The Role and Influence of Chaplains in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)*” describes the successful integration of chaplains in SANDF for internal and regional stability operations. Due to the long history of inter-tribal conflict in South Africa, the SANDF chaplains developed a practice of mediation for peace and stability that became authorized in South African constitutional law and defined in military doctrine.⁴⁰

Internal religious advisory boards became the training ground and template for a chaplain religious liaison role by the SANDF when operating in regional stability

operations. Chaplains trained in peace and stability operations accompany the two motorized infantry battalions employed by SANDF in peacekeeping missions. The chaplain functions as the “specialist in regard to religion, mediation, and negotiation between Peace and Stability Operations (PSO) forces, non-governmental organizations and religious groups.”⁴¹

The ability to transcend borders, as well as religious and political differences, to function in the role of negotiator between opposing parties is facilitated by the chaplain’s religious status. His reputation allows for dissemination of accurate information, exertion of positive influence and mediation aimed toward reconciliation and peaceful co-existence among indigenous religious groups and religious leaders. SANDF chaplains are also trained to coordinate efforts for effectiveness with other multinational PSO chaplains in the area.⁴²

Norway has also begun to codify the operational role of the chaplain in stability operations. Increased participation by Norway in international peacekeeping operations since the 1990s has led to greater use of chaplains. According to Chaplains Nils Terje Lunde and Bard Maeland of the Norwegian Defense Forces, chaplains are used to sustain contact with indigenous religious leaders as “a way of contributing constructively to conflict resolution.”⁴³

Historical examples and current foreign military chaplain practices give points of reference which to frame and understand an emerging doctrinal role for United States military chaplains to serve as religious liaisons in stability operations.

4

Modifications to the Chaplain Service

Authorization for Chaplains

Title 10 of the United States Code provides the legal foundation for military chaplaincy. As Approved by Title 10, every branch of the United States military has designated chaplains to provide for the religious and spiritual support of military members and their families, and to ensure the constitutional right of every military member to free exercise of their religion. Military chaplains are trained and prepared to specific standards through civilian and military education to enable them to respectfully facilitate the practice of religious traditions and faith for all military members without violating their own beliefs.⁴⁴

Current authorization for chaplain numbers and assignments needs to be modified for successful inclusion of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders for stability operations as described in this paper. Although this section addresses United States Army requirements, similar chaplain adjustments would be necessary for the other military services. United States Army figures are critical to stability operations since

they conduct the preponderance of stability operations. Current force structure assignment doctrine for Army chaplains, known as the “Forward Thrust Doctrine,” directs for chaplains to be deployed at a ratio of one per battalion with a ministry responsibility the size of the battalion area of operations.⁴⁵

To successfully support the chaplain’s current responsibilities and provide for the added tasking of inclusion of indigenous religious groups and religious leaders into stability operations, authorized chaplain assignments should expand. Unit strength should be increased adding one chaplain in the grade of Major, assigned to division level. This new position will be specifically tasked with the mission of religious liaison to be employed in stability operations. A paper generated from discussions held at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and written by Emma Kay and Major David Last also advocates for a senior chaplain in a similar role.⁴⁶

This additional chaplain resource would serve primarily as an informational and operational support to battalion level chaplains. Also this chaplain would be responsible for ensuring successful implementation of battalion chaplain level transition plans. These plans transition established IRCs to Civil Affairs units or those appropriate Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Religious Non-Governmental Organizations (RNGOs) that agree to be involved.

Civil Affairs unit chaplain authorizations should be one chaplain assigned per unit with the primary function of coordinating with the indigenous religions and maintaining the IRCs transitioned from the combat unit chaplains. Given the greater experience and training of chaplains to address the religious dimension of conflict, the potential access afforded as members of the clergy and the opportunity to build relationships as non-

combatants, the function of chaplains in stability operations complements the function and mission of Civil Affairs units.⁴⁷

According to Flavin, the increased number and assignment of chaplains would also support the need for commanders to “establish mechanisms at the combatant command and operational task force levels to support harmonization” through “extensive liaison activity” to coordinate efforts aimed at achieving stability operations objectives.⁴⁸ Further, this coordination would allow for post-conflict planning below the historical headquarters at echelons above corps and closer to the current and latter 20th century norm of smaller scale American military interventions. The resulting structure would help to avoid the possibility of winning the war tactically and operationally, but losing the peace strategically through inadequate planning.⁴⁹

Adjusting Doctrine and Training

Department of Defense policy and doctrine for the role of chaplains must be expanded to encompass the role of religious liaison to the local populace in initial stability operations. Currently, United States military chaplains are trained to conduct religious area analyses and assessments, but primarily for the purpose of advising the commander. The expanded role as religious liaison would allow for chaplains to directly interface with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders with the goal of developing dialogue, building relationships, promoting goodwill and creating formal IRCs. To successfully accomplish this mission, military chaplains will require additional training in core competencies.

Chaplain core competencies necessary to facilitate the functional role of religious liaison must enable the chaplain to develop an IRC representative of the indigenous

religious demographic. The IRC could be used by the combatant commander as one resource applied towards successful stability operations. Expanded competencies could then be incorporated into the functional action model of Assess, Plan, Implement and Evaluate (APIE). Table 1 organizes the required chaplain core competencies within the APIE model and connects their use to production of desired outcomes related to the IRC.

	Competencies		Inter-Religious Council Outcomes
Assess	Understand —	Religious demographic	Defines representative groups on IRC
	Identify —	Religious groups and religious leaders	
	Determine —	Religious impact on conflict	
Plan	Coordinate —	Indigenous religious contacts network	Determines individual representatives on IRC in synchronization with military operations
	Synchronize —	IRC formation with commanders intent and Phase IV planning	
Implement	Interface —	With indigenous religious groups and religious leaders	Directs group process toward acceptable outcomes
	Negotiate —	With groups toward consensus	
	Recommend —	Action to commanders	
Evaluate	Evaluate —	IRC effectiveness	Develops responsive dialogue based upon shared IRC and military concerns
	Modify —	Group membership and process	

Table 1: Required Chaplain Competencies and Inter-Religious Council Outcomes

Assessment phase competencies would include three steps. First is to *understand* key beliefs, history and percentage of the population and representation in government and society of those groups that impact stability operations. Second is the ability to *identify* the primary indigenous religious groups and religious leaders. The third step is to *determine* whether religion is a root cause of conflict or a vehicle for nationalism and ethnic passions.

The planning phase competencies would include two steps. First is the ability to *coordinate* contacts with the indigenous religious leaders and communities. The second step is to *synchronize* the plan for local contacts and the formation of the IRC with the military staff. This council would be synchronized with the combatant commander's intent, to include time, location and desired outcome for meetings. In a multinational operational area coordination must occur between United States military chaplains and other coalition chaplains located in the area to avoid redundancy of efforts.

The implementation phase competencies would include three steps. The first step would be to *interface* successfully with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders resulting in their participation in the IRC. The second step would be to *negotiate* issues toward consensus with diverse and often conflicted religious groups. The third step would be to *recommend* courses of action to the combatant commander based upon outcomes from IRC meetings. Recommendations would also include a plan for the transition of the IRC to Civil Affairs units or NGOs and RNGOs for continued operations, thus allowing for successful continuity.

Finally, the evaluation phase competencies for chaplains functioning in the role of religious liaison would be to *evaluate* the effectiveness of the IRC on an on-going basis.

Chaplains would also need to *modify* the membership and agenda of the IRC to ensure continued effectiveness to the combatant commander for promoting stability.

Once the core competencies necessary to accomplish this mission are established, chaplain training through the military chaplain schools must be modified to include curriculum that will incorporate these additional core competencies. Other modifications to training will be based on measurable chaplain proficiency in the core competencies and measurable results in the successful interaction with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders.

Incorporating the recommended training and measured follow-up will improve support for the initial liaison efforts with the indigenous religious communities. This support would lend itself to the establishment of an effectively functioning local IRC. The IRC will be the channel of communication between indigenous religious groups and religious leaders and the military commander for stability operations. The IRC will allow a network for the indigenous people to voice concerns, identify issues and to harness inter-religious cooperation. This cooperation is invaluable in ensuring a lasting peace and religious freedom.⁵⁰

Transitioning Responsibility

When the conflict area becomes stable and safe for non-combatant forces to enter, a transition of responsibility must occur. At that point it will be the responsibility of the combatant commander and staff to involve the chaplain as religious liaison to plan and implement a transition. Ideally unit chaplains would then transition IRC responsibilities and relationships to military Civil Affairs units that follow. Traditionally Civil Affairs units are responsible for the two-track role of liaising with local authorities and

coordinating with NGOs. However, changes in the staffing of Civil Affairs units and a struggle to redefine its institutional identity have marginalized these units and therefore reduced their effectiveness.⁵¹

Though a chaplain is often part of Civil Affairs units, this situation does not guarantee that there will always be a qualified chaplain in the Civil Affairs unit accessible to continue the religious liaison role. Reductions in the number of chaplains in Civil Affairs units after Operation Desert Storm have left many units without a chaplain. Furthermore, the role of chaplains in Civil Affairs units has changed from primarily religious liaison to the community to primarily religious support of Civil Affairs unit members. This limited role reduces the possibility of successfully transitioning the existing IRC to a Civil Affairs unit.⁵²

Given the reduction in number and change in role of chaplains in Civil Affairs units, the transition of the IRC from the unit chaplain might better be made to an NGO or RNGO. This transition will depend upon their skills, experience, training and accessibility in the area of operations and assessed ability to function in coordination with the military for stability operations. The chaplain would evaluate the appropriateness of available NGOs and RNGOs for a transition based in part on the requirement to be sensitive and respectful of indigenous religious groups and avoid of any appearance of proselytizing. It is important to differentiate between NGOs and RNGOs in functioning ability due to NGOs being non-sectarian in nature, while some RNGOs cannot function in a non-sectarian fashion due to their constituent mandate and mission statement. Again, chaplain training would require competency to differentiate between those NGOs and RNGOs appropriate for inclusion.

The United States military and government have historically coordinated with NGOs for stability operations, but have not yet effectively coordinated with RNGOs for stability operations. Professor Julia Berger of Harvard University's Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations comments on the usefulness of RNGOs. She observes that while current Western mentality may limit religion to private life, RNGOs demonstrate a unique mixture of religious beliefs and sociopolitical activism throughout all levels of society that would relate well to the Muslim world where religion and society are fully integrated.⁵³ The 2001 World Conference on Religion and Peace stated that "Religious communities are, without question, the largest and best-organized civil institutions in the world today...bridging the divides of race, class and nationality. They are uniquely equipped to meet the challenges of our time: resolving conflicts...promoting peaceful co-existence among all peoples."⁵⁴

If chaplains are not accessible in Civil Affairs units, then RNGOs would be the best candidates for transitioning IRCs from initial military combat unit chaplains. Such a transition would ensure continuity and accessibility of the IRC for ongoing stability operations for two reasons. First, religious groups and religious leaders often have a respect for other avowed religious representatives. Second, there are RNGOs representing every major faith group. A limited listing to illustrate the representative breadth of RNGOs includes the International Buddhist Foundation, World Jewish Congress, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision International, Muslim World League and the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy.

Provided the chaplain has the core competency of awareness related to these groups, these RNGOs would serve best for a transition from the established IRC in the absence of

a chaplain in the Civil Affairs unit. Whatever the ultimate coordination with or responsibility of NGOs or RNGOs, it is clear that these groups could provide a virtual network of transition and support for developed IRCs. Further, it is a natural “fit” for military chaplains to work in close coordination with NGOs and RNGOs to facilitate humanitarian operations.⁵⁵

5

Conclusions and Responses to Potential Objections

Recommendations

It is apparent that religion will remain a defining element in many societies for the foreseeable future. As the United States conducts foreign policy and military operations it must assess and consider the impact of religion in societies to achieve success in operations and long-term stability in a region. As noted earlier, failure to do so is at our own potential peril. Successful incorporation of religious groups and religious leaders for stability operations will enable a greater chance for achieving United States foreign policy goals and long-term stability in areas of operation.

Implementation of the recommendations listed in Table 2 below will effect the necessary operational changes. The corresponding agencies responsible for implementation of these recommended changes are noted. These recommendations would result in a necessary change in organizational culture for policies to be implemented strategically, operationally and tactically. Although the corresponding

agencies for Table 2 are specific to the United States Army, other military services have similar agencies which would also address the recommended changes.

Recommended Changes	Responsible Agencies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doctrinally expand chaplaincy role to include religious liaison function in stability operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Headquarters, Department of the Army
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify religion as a defined axis of power to be evaluated in planning and implementation of United States foreign policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department of Defense • Department of State
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish doctrine for inclusion of religious component in planning and operations across range of Department of Defense operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each military branch • Joint Forces Command
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorize one chaplain per civil affairs unit in specified role of religious liaison 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • G-3, Headquarters, Department of the Army
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorize additional chaplain slot at division-level headquarters in role of religious liaison support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • G-3, Headquarters, Department of the Army
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field religious information virtual network for commanders and chaplains operational use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify, recruit and assign chaplains for religious liaison role 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States Army Chief of Chaplains Office
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train chaplains to standard as religious liaison 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TRADOC Military Schools System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train officer and non-commissioned officers in religious awareness and utilization of chaplain as religious liaison 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TRADOC Military Schools System

Table 2: Recommendations for Required Changes and Responsible Agencies

There is a need for a major paradigm shift in understanding the relationship of religion to United States foreign policy and military operations. As this paradigm shift occurs it will be validated by the Department of Defense embracing religion as a factor of

foreign national power to be assessed in mission planning and operations. Leadership will intentionally designate religion as a categorical imperative in intelligence operations, information warfare, threat level assessment, defining the operational battle space, mission planning and execution in conducting stability operations.

Doctrine must be developed to define how inclusion of the religious component will occur and what form it will take in individual military services, joint United States operations and joint international operations. Doctrine development and formulation will best happen within an interagency planning context. Military and non-military input would allow for the strongest and most relevant doctrine. Non-military agencies should include, but would not be limited to: United States Institute of Peace, United States Agency for International Development and Department of State.

The functional role of military chaplains should be doctrinally expanded to include the role of religious liaison during stability operations. The role of religious liaison must be defined in official doctrine and delineated to conform to current standards and parameters of operation. Doctrinal mandate and delineation would serve to mitigate operational risk and protect the chaplain as a religious liaison. Continuing to allow or use chaplains to function unofficially as religious liaisons without the protection of doctrinal mandate incurs too great a risk. Chaplain training must be conducted to ensure each chaplain has the competencies necessary to perform this mission and each chaplain meets a consistent standard that denotes and guarantees strict tolerances within acceptable margins of error.

Chaplain slots in all Civil Affairs units should be at least one per unit with the primary mission of coordinating with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders.

An additional chaplain should be assigned to the headquarters of division size units to support battalion chaplains and to facilitate transition of IRCs from battalion chaplains to Civil Affairs units or NGOs. A virtual network of information on religious groups, religious leaders, religious history in regions, NGOs and RNGOs should be developed and fielded for use by commanders and chaplains. Further, chaplain recruiting and assignments of military school instructors and division level chaplains should be targeted towards subject matter experts with the training and skills for a religious liaison. Chaplains with these skills and experience will be critical to the success of the religious liaison role and further success during stability operations.

In order for chaplains to be effectively used in this expanded role of religious liaison, it will be necessary for training on the expanded chaplain's role and utilization to be integrated into officer training programs of instruction at all levels. Also, training for officers and non-commissioned officers should include basic understanding of the role of religion in cultures, its impact on all phases of combat operations and beliefs of major world religions. Supplemental training should also be provided on specific areas of concern in preparation for possible combat operations.

It is imperative that future officers who assume command of combat operations understand the fundamentals addressed in this paper. A commander often has a military lawyer and intelligence officer by their side when substantial decisions are being addressed. Chaplains in the future will be just as important to a commander conducting stability operations, as currently are intelligence and legal personnel. Military leadership must be comfortable with embracing this added value by understanding that an individual

does not have to become religious in order to understand religion and appreciate its importance in stability operations.

These recommendations would doctrinally establish the chaplain as religious liaison to interface with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders in stability operations. This policy implementation would also assist the United States military in transforming the asymmetric, soft power of indigenous religious influence into a significant source of power for mission accomplishment, peace and long-term stability.

Roadblocks to Implementation

The policy changes recommended in this research paper could be implemented only with considerable care and institutional energy due to the sensitive, personal and potentially volatile nature of religious issues. Any attempt to integrate religious actors is potentially risky given the often deep ethno-religious tensions between and among them. In some settings, cooperation by indigenous religious leaders with any officers of the United States military may be readily perceived as collaboration with the occupiers.⁵⁶ However, if the United States military accepts the inevitable necessity of integrating religious leaders into stability operations, then roadblocks to adjustment of current doctrine that tasks this requirement to military chaplains must be addressed.

Six potential objections exist against this expanded doctrinal role for military chaplains as a religious liaison. Though other arguments may exist, these six were most often noted and raised the most significant concerns. Table 3 summarizes these potential objections along with a corresponding response.

Objections	Responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Will distract from primary role of chaplain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Expands current role of advising commanders ● Formalizes traditional unofficial role
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Risk of incident too great 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Can train to standard within acceptable margin of error
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Chaplains should not be involved in combat operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Current doctrine directs chaplain presence in all phases of military operations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Chaplains are an unprotected security risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Chaplain assistant protects the chaplain ● Increased security is an available option
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Violates chaplain professional and religious ethics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Individual decision by each chaplain ● Chaplains customarily make ethical decisions successfully
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Violates parameters of denominational endorsement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Liaison role acceptable to most religious endorsing bodies ● Chaplain cannot be compelled to violate their own beliefs

Table 3: Objections to Chaplains as Religious Liaisons and Responses

The first objection is this expanded role will take chaplains away from their primary focus of ministry to military members. Historically chaplains have often unofficially assumed this role of religious liaison. While often quite effective, chaplains have assumed this role with considerable risk due to a lack of both doctrinal mandate and standard training for success. Further, while spiritual and religious support of military members is important, it is only half of the primary role for the chaplain.

The chaplain is also doctrinally tasked with advising the commander in matters pertaining to religion, morals and morale. Chaplain (Major) Pete Sniffin, of the United

States Army Chaplain Center and School advocates that an expanded role for chaplains as religious area liaisons is justified by the current doctrinal requirement to advise the commander. It is the recommendation for this expanded role to be practiced only until transition is made to the follow-on Civil Affairs units and not long-term. The short term nature of the expanded role is dependent on Civil Affairs units having a chaplain assigned and trained or the appropriateness of a transition to an NGO or RNGO.

A second argument against an expanded doctrinal role for chaplains as religious area liaisons is that there is too great a risk of creating an incident due to the differing capabilities of individual chaplains. In response, it has been addressed that core competencies will be identified and trained to standard for all chaplains to ensure the best chance of success in interactions with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders. Individual competence and ongoing training and development are the norm for all military specialties. Chaplains can be trained to function successfully in this role with standards that denote and guarantee strict tolerances with acceptable margins of error. The impact of local religions on mission success cannot be ignored, and chaplains are by far the best possible choice to embrace indigenous religious groups and religious leaders into stability operations.

A third argument against chaplain involvement in stability operations is that chaplains are not engage in combat operations and Phase IV, or stability operations, is part of combat operations. According to the Geneva Convention and United States military doctrine, chaplains are considered non-combatants and forbidden to bear arms. However, United States military doctrine also prescribes for chaplains to be present to support the spiritual needs and free exercise of religious rights of military members

throughout all phases of combat operations.⁵⁷ It is doctrine that directs chaplains, though non-combatants, to be active and present in support of United States service members through all phases of combat, including Phase IV stability operations. In this regard, there is no difference between the chaplains as non-combatants on the D-Day beaches in World War II ministering to troops and ministering to troops in 21st Century stability operations.

A fourth argument against expanding the chaplain mission in stability operations, to include the function as religious liaison with indigenous religious groups and religious leaders, is that chaplains would be an unprotected security risk. Again, this argument is answered by current doctrine that directs chaplains to always function as part of a UMT. The UMT does include, in addition to the chaplain, a chaplain assistant who does bear arms, and is tasked with protection of the chaplain at all times.⁵⁸ Just as in the previous three phases of combat operations, the chaplain assistant will protect the chaplain in Phase IV of combat operations. Additional protection may be required in more complicated situations, but this necessity would be true for any military personnel.

A fifth objection against this expanded role for chaplains is the ethical concern that as chaplains interface with indigenous religious leaders to gather information, it might lead to that information being used in mission planning resulting in the loss of life. This concern would be largely addressed by limiting utilization of the chaplain as a religious area liaison to Phase IV stability operations when major combat operations are declared over. However, additional ethical questions and concerns must individually be addressed by chaplains as are any other ethical concerns posed to clergy serving in the military.

Clearly there are potential obstacles, but none that cannot be overcome successfully with clarity of purpose, delineated standards of conduct and clear rules of engagement.

A final objection to chaplains serving as religious area liaisons is that it violates the parameters of ministry defined by the chaplain's religious denomination that endorses and allows their service in the military. This situation is generally not a limit imposed by most endorsing denominations. Those few cases where it is a limiting factor on a chaplain's service would be identified early in a chaplain's career in initial military schooling using the recommended core competency training already described in this paper. Additionally, military doctrine allows for chaplains to decline to do anything that is in violation of their personal religious convictions and cannot be further commanded to perform such activity. However, chaplains could not refuse to function as a religious liaison simply because they view the role as less intrinsically rewarding than ministry with soldiers and families.

Future Research

Further research in this area of study should focus on identifying and clarifying chaplain core competencies and training necessary to achieve individual proficiency to a standard. Detailed curriculum needs to be developed and accessed so that it can be integrated into chaplain's core competencies. This training would incorporate how to transition from military Civil Affairs units to the Department of State for longer-term stability operations. Additional officer training at all levels is necessary to understand the role of indigenous religions and how to embrace them through the unit chaplain's role as religious liaison.

Another area for future research is to address why and how indigenous religious groups would embrace the chaplain. Such a study could address the motivations and methods that would encourage these groups to interface with chaplains of a military they may harbor ill will towards. As noted earlier, cooperation by indigenous religious leaders with any officers of the United States military may be readily perceived as collaboration with the occupiers.

Inclusion of religion as a factor and religious leaders as potential resources for stability operations should be just one part of a seamless plan of well thought out United States foreign policy and military doctrine that tie national interests with international circumstances and relationships. The results should be applied to the State Department interventions and Department of Defense operations. These interventions and operations should be in conjunction with United States Agency for International Development, United States Institute of Peace and other United States agency's support that aims toward building peaceful, stable and representative governments throughout the global community of nations.

This research paper has illustrated and highlighted the necessity of establishing military doctrine for chaplains to serve as religious liaisons to embrace indigenous religions in stability operations. There is much work to be addressed in this area and to fully understand the power of religion in diplomacy. However, following this path to its ultimate conclusion will help to mitigate the possibility that the initial scenario illustrated in this paper ever reaches its climax.

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Glossary

APIE	Assess, Plan, Implement and Evaluate
CH	Chaplain
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
IRC	Inter-Religious Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PSO	Peace and Stability Operations
RNGO	Religious Non-Governmental Organization
SANDF	South African National Defence Force Chaplain Service
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UMT	Unit Ministry Team

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